Privatization has increasingly become a policy option for government agencies struggling to meet rising demands for services but with fewer resources. In the transportation arena, many state departments of transportation (DOTs) have privatized by outsourcing highway functions to the private sector. But the outsourcing of technical and expert services such as those related to the design and construction of highway infrastructure may result in a smaller or less knowledgeable DOT workforce that is unable to perform the necessary contract management to ensure the quality of the work done by contractors. We posit an outsourcing process in which DOTs respond to the combination of increased demand for highway services and growing workforce constraints by contracting out much of the work formerly performed by in-house personnel. This, in turn, can produce perceptions of quality problems regarding the outsourced work and a subsequent expansion of the workforce. We examine the extent to which different highway-related tasks are being outsourced, the effect of workforce and employment factors on outsourcing, the perceptions of highway officials regarding the impact of outsourcing on cost effectiveness and service quality of the outsourced work, and subsequent employment levels. 
INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, there has been a worldwide movement away from direct provision by public employees of government's traditional functions. Increasingly governments contract with private sector firms for the procurement of public goods and services (i.e. privatization). It should come as no surprise that privatization has become a popular option for government agencies struggling with dwindling resources with which to provide public goods and services to an expanding population. Outsourcing and various public-private partnerships are seen as viable solutions to the challenge of meeting service needs in the face of what Osborne and Hutchinson (2004) label a "permanent fiscal crisis." In the highway arena, which is the focus of this study, the turn to private sector contractors can be attributed to many factors, including state personnel shortages, the need for expertise, the pressure to reduce costs, and the potential for improved quality of service.
Contracting, however, poses risks to government agencies. The contracting relationship throughout American history has had more than its share of blemishes in the form of graft, corruption, shoddy work, and incompetence (Keeney, 2007; Durant, Girth, & Johnston, 2009 ).
Thus, there is no a priori reason to assume that outsourcing will bring either lower costs or improved quality. Indeed, there is sufficient research to conclude that outsourcing does not automatically result in lower costs or improved quality in many situations (see for example Condrey & Battaglio, 2007; Hodge, 2000; Brudney, Fernandez, Ryu & Wright, 2005; Bowman & West, 2006) . It may even increase costs and/or lower quality (Sclar, 2000; Bendick, 1989) . In that the results of outsourcing can vary from beneficial to deleterious, research is needed to examine its effects across the various governmental functions to which it has been applied. This study examines the outsourcing of highway-related functions by state departments of transportation (DOTs) . 1 We specifically ask: what is the relationship between outsourcing and government employment in the context of highly technical and expert services such as the delivery of transportation infrastructure? We posit a dialectical sequence in which DOT's outsource functions, which may result in private sector employees replacing government employees and thus reducing government employment. This reduction is followed by a subsequent increase in employment, which we suggest is in response to perceptions of reduced quality associated with outsourced work.
Several studies have focused on privatization by state DOTs. However, most of the studies have been case studies of one or a few highway agencies (DeHart-Davis & Kingsley, 2005; Gen & Kingsley, 2007; Lee & Kingsley, 2009; Ponomariov & Kingsley, 2008) . Our study employs the results of a survey sent to all state DOTs in the United States to explore the effects of outsourcing on the cost and quality of services. We examine the extent to which highwayrelated tasks are being outsourced, the perceptions of highway officials regarding the impact of outsourcing on cost effectiveness and service quality, and the relationships between outsourcing and employment in the state DOT.
In the next section, we review the research on state DOT contracting for services, followed by research on the effects of outsourcing on cost and quality. We then discuss the possible effects of outsourcing on the in-house capacity of DOTs to provide effective oversight. We draw five hypotheses from the research, describe the data, and present the analysis and findings. The conclusion presents implications for the practice and study of outsourcing.
RESEARCH ON CONTRACTING OUT FOR HIGHWAY SERVICES DOT Contracting for Highway Services as a Response to Inadequate Staffing
1 While our analysis involves state DOTs, our focus is on the highway functions of these DOTs. Specifically, we examine changes in employment levels related to highway functions. Witheford (1997) traced the history of outsourcing by state DOTs and documented the considerable increase in the amount of work outsourced to external consultants by the 1990s.
Design activities were the first to be widely outsourced, followed by maintenance activities in the 1970s and administrative functions in the 1980s. This privatization trend continued into the 2000s. Ellis et al. (2000) found that 85% of state DOTs were using outside consultants to perform some of their construction engineering and inspection activities. A 2002 survey conducted by the Council of State Governments (CSG) found that highway and transportation functions are widely privatized, with 61% of responding state DOTs reporting that they had outsourced 15% or more of their work (Chi et al., 2004) . Ponomariov and Kingsley (2008) identified several conditions conducive for a state DOT to outsource. The first condition, the expansion of transportation facilities, points to the increased demand due to a growing volume of automobile and truck traffic. The other conditions involve workforce shortages, including (1) public finance rules that limit the ability to hire and use state employees on transportation projects; (2) previous downsizing of the workforce; (3) retirements by an aging workforce; and (4) changing civil service rules that make it possible for employees to retire early from the DOT and then work for private contractors. Witheford (1999) and Warne (2003) observed that while federal legislations significantly increased the funds available to the states for highway programs, the states had static or reduced workforce levels with which to accomplish the work and were compelled to contract much of the work. Calderon et al. (2000) conducted an in-depth analysis of DOT workforce issues and outsourcing. They observed that competition with private industry for professional engineers was driving many decisions to contract for various engineering services. Some states faced significant pay differences between the public and private sectors that caused additional challenges for DOTs in hiring and retaining staff. To complicate matters, many states have been legally restrained from increasing the size of the work force, even when workloads have been rising (Rogge et al., 2003; Ponomariov & Kingsley, 2008) . Gen and Kingsley (2007) argued that state DOTs have contracted out to "bridge the labor gap" created by the reduction in the number of transportation and highway personnel. Presumably, organizations outsource the work for which they are ill-suited or unprepared to perform (Durant et al, 2009 ).
The previous studies strongly suggest that highway outsourcing is as much a response to a shortage of qualified personnel to address growing demand for services as it is a reflection of a desire to economize on expenditures by reducing government personnel. One indicator of this would be greater outsourcing by the DOTs with smaller workforces or whose workforces have been shrinking in prior years. Another would be outsourcing when utilization of highway services goes up in a state, as indicated by an increase in VMT or lane miles. Coupling workforce with utilization of the transportation system, offers one measure of the state DOT's capacity. Specifically, a high ratio would indicate the DOT has slack capacity to manage and maintain the state's highway system. In contrast, a low ratio would suggest low capacity to address any additional pressure or demand placed on the system. Based on the literature on outsourcing of highway functions, we hypothesize that outsourcing is driven by the state DOT's lack of capacity to meet additional demands placed on the highway system with its existing workforce. This lack of capacity can be measured both in terms of direct workforce measures (such as number of employees or growth in the number of employees) and the ratio of employees to vehicle miles travelled (VMT). Of course, as suggested by the literature, outsourcing may also contribute to workforce reduction through loss of personnel as private sector workers replace government workers. This raises the possibility of simultaneity in that a reduction in personnel can be the motive for outsourcing even as outsourcing can be a response to a shortage of qualified personnel.
However, we overcome this concern regarding simultaneity by explicitly incorporating the time element into the analysis. Specifically, we examine outsourcing as an outcome of employment factors from previous years. It is unlikely that the outsourcing decision in any given year will influence the number of DOT employees in prior years or the growth (decline) in employment levels in the DOT over those prior years.
The Impact of Outsourcing on Cost and Quality
Although most advocates of outsourcing argue that it reduces the cost of government, the empirical record suggests there are conditions under which it can in fact increase the cost of providing goods and services (Durant et al., 2009 ). Milward et al. (1993 contended that outsourcing can result in a "hollow state," a condition likely to foster inadequate oversight of contractors. While Savas (2000) argued that competition in the bidding process is the key to reducing costs, there may not be a sufficient number of bidders to keep costs low (DeHoog, 1990; Brown & Potoski, 2004) . A state DOT may come to rely on a limited number of competitors, exposing it to the perils of small numbers bargaining (Williamson, 1975) . In fact, DOT officials may even abandon bidding by turning to direct solicitation of the contractors they trust (Gen & Kingsley, 2007) . Moreover, the process of creating, executing and managing contracts requires significant time, effort, and personnel, the cost of which may cancel out any savings generated from outsourcing. Wilmot et al. (1999) found that contract management raised costs 20% above the in-house level, with the difference being almost completely due to the additional costs from contract preparation and supervision of the contracted work.
It is no surprise then that the empirical record on the effects of outsourcing is mixed (Boyne, 1998; Brudney et al., 2005) . Often the savings associated with outsourcing are either small (Chi et al., 2004 : Hodge, 2000 Rehfuss, 1990) , or non-existent (Duggan, 2004) . Even within the same study, the findings can be mixed. For instance, Brudney et al. (2005) found that close to 25% of state agencies reported contracting out decreased the cost of delivering services, while 29% reported higher costs.
For transportation infrastructure and services, a CSG study (Chi et al., 2004) found that fewer than 5% of responding agencies reported cost savings of 10 percent or more. Ellis et al. (2000) observed that construction engineering costs when performed in house were 9% of total project costs but when performed by outside contractors were 12% of total project costs, and when DOT contract monitoring and administration costs were factored in, the outsourced work became 15% of the total project costs.
We found only one study that examined the impact of outsourcing on quality as well as cost (Brudney et al 2005) . It found that respondents were more likely to view outsourcing as improving work quality (50% of respondents) than lowering costs (35% of respondents). Given the finding of previous studies on the minimal impact of outsourcing on cost savings and the finding that outsourcing is more likely to improve quality than cost, coupled with the possible tendency to turn to contracting when in-house expertise is lacking (rather than to reduce costs),
we hypothesize that state DOTs will be more likely to view outsourcing as improving the quality of service delivery than to lower the cost of providing services.
Hypothesis 2 State DOTs will perceive outsourcing to be more likely to improve quality than to lower costs.
The Subsequent Consequences of Outsourcing on Employment Levels
An undesirable loss of skilled employees with in-house production capabilities is a possible consequence of the outsourcing process. When an organization performs work in-house, its employees often develop deep knowledge and expertise in regard to each step of the production process (Durant et al., 2009 ). Outsourcing lacks this advantage and can reduce an organization's capacity to perform skilled work (Gen & Kingsley, 2007) . Several years after outsourcing, an organization could find itself in need of in-house personnel with the requisite skills.
We could find no studies on the impact of outsourcing on the subsequent employment levels of DOTs. But Donahue (2002: 275) found that, in general, the effect of outsourcing on employment levels was slight, and concluded that "[f]ar from cutting to the heart of public employment, privatization seems to have been (at least so far) nibbling around its edges." Greene (2002) observed a similar pattern among local governments. State DOTs may see reduced employment due to the actual outsourcing of work but given the emphasis on improved service quality over realizing cost savings, these state DOTs may also compensate by hiring additional staff or retaining existing staff for oversight and management tasks. Therefore, the greater the extent to which the DOT outsources highway functions, the greater the need for contract management and oversight and the lower the likelihood that the DOT will see reductions in its workforce. Furthermore, the greater the expectation and perception of service quality problems, the more the state DOT will employ additional employees to ensure the desired level of quality.
This also lowers the likelihood of workforce reductions due to outsourcing. In both situations, the state DOTs will likely see growth in its workforce due to the addition of staff for contract management and oversight. Therefore, in studying the effect of outsourcing on DOT employment levels, we hypothesize that: Bureau (employment data) and the U.S. Department of Transportation (highway data). We also collected political and economic data at the state level. Specifically, our dataset included citizen and state government ideology (Berry et al. 1998) , population, population density, gross state product, and unemployment rates. These variables are intended to capture political and economic forces that may influence outsourcing and employment levels in state highway agencies. However, as will be discussed in the results section, these variables were not included in the final model. Table 1 summarizes the variables included in the analysis, their sources, and descriptive statistics. Table 1 about here
Survey of Highway Functions Outsourced by State DOTs
The survey of functions outsourced by state departments of transportation (DOTs) Hancher and Werkmeister (2001) . Despite the inability to specify the extent to which work is outsourced within the individual highway functions, our analysis captures the variety of function that are outsourced by state DOTs. Compared to other studies that do not specifically look across the many highway functions, our study examines outsourcing more broadly rather than focusing only on design or construction. Our focus is on the spread of outsourcing across the major functions of a highway agency, which we view as a measure of the extent of outsourcing. Some of the services included in the survey do not require technical expertise, but all entail an element of expertise in that the contractor must perform the expert task of organizing and supervising the work of both skilled and unskilled workers.
In addition to identifying the specific functions outsourced by each state, the survey asked for an evaluation of the perceived impact of outsourcing on the cost and service quality of the work outsourced. That is, was the outsourced work worse, the same, or better than when performed in-house by the state DOT? Respondents were asked to rate the impact of outsourcing each function on cost of service and quality of service on a Likert scale ranging from 1 to 5. A rating of one or two meant that outsourcing had a negative effect in terms of cost or quality; a three meant outsourcing produced no change in cost or quality; and a four or five indicated a positive change in cost or quality.
Because only 30 state DOTs responded to the survey, nonresponse bias was a concern in that those who responded may be more likely to outsource to a greater or lesser degree compared to those who did not. To check for bias, we compared survey respondents against nonrespondents according to two other measures of privatization. The first is a measure of whether the state had, in recent years, sold or leased major transportation assets to private firms (ULI -
The Urban Land Institute and Ernst & Young, 2007) . The second is the percentage of transportation functions outsourced obtained from the 2002 CSG Survey (Chi et al. 2004 ). Using both measures, there are no statistically significant differences between survey respondents and non-respondents in terms of their privatization activities, suggesting that nonresponse bias is not an issue.
Transportation and Highway Data
Our analysis also relies on data from the U. 
RESULTS

Extent of Outsourcing of Highway Functions and Perceptions of Effectiveness
Data from the survey of state DOTs indicate that most states outsource some part of a substantial number of highway functions. Table 3 summarizes the outsourcing of different highway functions. As observed earlier, the survey does not provide information about the extent to which each function was outsourced. Also, given that the survey was administered only in 2003, we are limited in our ability to measure the year-to-year fluidity and the multidirectional nature of highway outsourcing over time. However, while privatization practices in 2003 reflect prior decisions made with regard to outsourcing, it also reflects present year decisions to continue or discontinue contracting out with private sector firms. Table 2 about here
In public policy, perceptions can be of equal importance to facts. The survey of state DOT outsourcing of functions asked the agency's staff to provide their perceptions of the cost effectiveness and service quality of the highway functions outsourced. Average responses for the different highway functions are presented in Table 2 . The means on a 5-point scale (with 1 being most negative effect, 3 being no effect, and 5 being most positive effect) were 3.2 for cost and 3.8 for quality. Thus, respondents reported almost no cost savings from outsourcing, while perceiving small improvements in the quality of service. These results are supportive of Hypothesis 2, which predicted that perceptions of outsourcing's effect on quality would be higher than perceptions of its effect on cost effectiveness. That the perception of service quality are more positive compared to the perception of cost savings is statistically significant across all highway functions (t=6.236, p<0.0001). Furthermore, this difference between perceived quality and perceived cost savings does not vary depending on the extent to which the state DOT outsources. Specifically, this difference is not correlated with the extent of outsourcing (r= -0.1464, p=0.4661). Therefore, state DOTs that outsource more functions do not perceive such outsourcing to contribute more to quality than to cost savings, or vice versa.
The findings in Table 2 also show that highway departments are more likely to outsource some part of their core functions (e.g., planning, right of way, and design) than they are to outsource some part of their less central functions (e.g., traffic operations, equipment purchasing, and rest areas). Moreover, they do so despite indicating higher levels of quality and cost effectiveness from outsourcing the less central functions.
Employment Factors Driving State DOT Outsourcing
Our first regression model examines the extent to which the outsourcing of highway functions is associated with employment-related factors. Table 3 
-----------------------------------
Insert Table 3 about here
Given the small sample size and concerns over degrees-of-freedom in the analysis, we first ran a full model with variables from all four categories as independent variables. In this full model, however, only employment-related variables were statistically significant. Therefore, a Table 3 . While the omission of the remaining three categories of independent variables may prompt concerns regarding an underspecified model and a negative effect on the explanatory power of the model, we believe the benefits of parsimony outweigh these concerns. Analysis of the correlations between the variables dropped from the model and those included in the final model suggest that omitted variable bias is not a problem.
Regression results in Table 3 show support for Hypothesis 1, which predicts that state DOTs will outsource more functions as capacity, measured by the ratio of the highway-related workforce to state VMT, decreases. Other employment-related measures had the predicted negative relationship with the percent of highway functions outsourced and all were statistically Table 4 .
Insert Table 4 about here
Results of the regression analysis show that as predictors of the change in highwayrelated FTE employment , the percent of functions outsourced was positive and marginally significant (p<.10) and the perceived service quality of outsourcing in 2003 (Hypothesis 3b) was negative and statistically significant (P<.05). This provides support for Hypotheses 3a and 3b.
For every additional highway function outsourced by a state DOT (6.25% increase in percent of highway functions outsourced), the resulting impact on FTE employment is four-fold (27.7% additional growth in FTE employment). In contrast, a unit decrease in the perceived service quality of outsourcing, for example going from 3 (outsourcing has no effect) to 2 (outsourcing has negative effect), results in a 95% increase in FTE employment. As these results indicate, there is a strong relationship between subsequent employment and the extent of outsourcing and perceived service effectiveness of outsourcing. However, outsourcing cost effectiveness was not statistically significant as a predictor of growth in DOT employment.
The Overall Relationship between Outsourcing and DOT employment
In addition to the regression analyses, we also developed a path model that summarizes the relationship between employment and outsourcing variables over multiple years. This path model is presented in Figure 1 -
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
We have four primary findings from our analysis of outsourcing of highway functions by state DOTs. All have implications for our understanding of outsourcing and pose interesting questions for future research. First, most state DOTs are outsourcing a substantial number of different highway functions. Of these functions, those requiring specialized or technical skills, such as assessment and acquisition of right-of-way, surveying/photogrammetry, and geotechnical/materials testing, are outsourced more extensively (i.e. by more state DOTs). One of the contributions of this study is that, unlike other studies on outsourcing, we explicitly address the different highway functions that state DOTs may outsource. This allows for an examination of outsourcing across the different functions. However, our analysis focuses on DOT outsourcing at the aggregate level. Future research could focus more on analyzing outsourcing of these different functions. For example, researchers could examine whether if and how state DOTs are outsourcing core or central functions, or if they are focusing more on noncore functions and purchasing services that are more peripheral to their essential tasks.
Second, respondents from these state DOTs believe that outsourcing is more likely to improve quality than reduce costs. They reported almost no cost savings from outsourcing and small improvements in the quality of service, which supports our hypothesis that perceptions of outsourcing's effect on quality would be higher than perceptions of its effect on cost effectiveness. The respondents in the survey of DOT outsourcing reported an overall lack of perceived cost savings from their outsourcing, a finding similar to that of Brudney et al. (2005) , which may be an artifact of two related factors. First, our results imply that DOTs are probably more likely to outsource functions in areas where they lack sufficient expertise or lack a sufficient number of trained employees, and probably realize few cost savings when they have to pay the going rate for engineering skills, which tend to be costly. That cost savings are not associated with DOT employment levels might also be explained by the work of Ponomariov and Kingsley (2008) who found that the use of outsourcing, instead of being based on strategic decisions about potential cost reductions, has been spurred by incremental and reactive adaptations to internal and external events, such as a change in demand for services. It thus appears that a desire to save money may have very little to do with much of the turn to outsourcing by DOTs. Our finding that increased outsourcing led to higher employment levels in subsequent years is in line with research by Gransberg and Molenaar (2008) , who in a survey of state DOTs found that a majority of the DOTs reported their professional workforce either remained the same or increased in size despite extensive outsourcing.
Third, lack of state DOT capacity to address additional pressure or demand placed on the highway system increases the extent of DOT outsourcing. Specifically, as state DOT capacity decreases, the DOT tends to outsource a greater number of highway functions.
Finally, the extent of outsourcing and the perception of lower service quality from outsourcing have a positive effect on the level of subsequent state DOT employment.
Conversely, our analysis shows that state DOTs that perceive outsourcing as providing service quality comparable to or better than direct provision may perceive less need to expand the workforce to address possible accountability issues. Positive perceptions of outsourcing service quality may then contribute to the DOT being more receptive to additional outsourcing, further reducing the need for in-house expertise. Combined, these findings provide support for our hypotheses and suggest that there is a relationship between outsourcing and employment within state DOTs that unfolds over time with opposite results.
One possible (and logical) explanation for this relationship is what can be labeled the accountability dilemma of outsourcing a complex task. This dilemma can be expressed in the form of the question: How does a public administrator know that a contractor is doing a complex task well when he or she lacks a sufficient number of employees (or employees with the right expertise) to assess the work plan, the cost estimates, and the overall quality of the work delivered by the contractor? While we believe that this kind of accountability dilemma could drive the subsequent increase in state DOT staff for management and oversight purposes, we do not have sufficient data in this study to test this. Future research may be able to tease out the role of the accountability dilemma, if any, in explaining the continued growth in state DOT employment after a turn to outsourcing.
Our findings suggest some additional implications for future research on the possible accountability dilemma associated with outsourcing government goods and services, particularly those that have high value-added or that involve significant technical expertise. However, our findings are tentative, as our measure of outsourcing does not include the percent of each function outsourced. And, of course, there are additional concerns motivating contracting out besides cost and quality. Moreover, these results may not be true of the less production oriented or technical-oriented government agencies (such as social services or corrections). Last, contracting out is a complex phenomenon that can have ramifications beyond those on the specific function in question, as savings in one area of an agency can impose costs on another.
We must acknowledge several key limitations of our study. First, given the small number of states that responded to the survey of state DOTs, we had a small sample to work with.
Furthermore, while we attempted to incorporate political variables into our model, concerns for parsimony and over degrees-of-freedom prompted the exclusion of these variables. As such, our research does not address the role of political factors that have been argued to influence transportation policy and administration. These factors play an important role in broader statelevel policies regarding privatization, for example the decision to adopt privatization-enabling legislation. They may also influence agency-level decisions regarding privatizing government services or functions, although this connection is less clear. However, our analysis completely excludes political variables, so we are unable to address this linkage.
Another major limitation is the measurement of the extent of outsourcing. Clearly, future research will need to look at a more comprehensive measure of outsourcing or some substitute for it such as the percent of the state highway budget spent on contracts. This would allow a better estimate of the extent to which the state highway program is outsourced and the relationship to DOT employment levels. It would also be quite useful to extend the analysis to looking at the impact of outsourcing on highway performance indicators, particularly in light of questions about service quality of contracted work. The literature suggests that increased privatization should be accompanied by increased contract management and oversight. This might require not only additional employees, as suggested by our study, but also more specialized, highly-paid employees. The latter is not addressed in this study, but may be examined by looking at payroll trends. It is also of interest that maintenance, the function that employs the greatest number of highway department personnel, is less likely than many other functions to be outsourced. This requires further study, as some respondents may not have considered the more expensive and frequently outsourced forms of maintenance (e.g., one inch overlays) when responding to the survey.
On a final note, this study offers a unique dimension of outsourcing in that we incorporate concerns about service quality and cost effectiveness, which has been neglected not only by researchers in the transportation outsourcing arena but researchers in privatization and outsourcing more generally. We used subjective measures of perceived service quality and cost effectiveness of the outsourced work, which may be cause for concern for some. While objective measures may be better, such measures are not available and we argue that subjective perceptions remain important as they influence decision making within the state DOT to the same extent as objective measures. However, a greater concern would be that respondents may not know whether service quality or costs have improved or deteriorated following outsourcing.
Specifically, they may not have a basis for making the comparison, for example, if they did not have exposure to the pre-contracting experience. Additionally, potential bias exists in the measure given that these respondents may also be involved in making the outsourcing decision, and may provide ex-post assessment that is consistent with or justifies the decision to outsource.
Future research should examine how the subjective measures correlate with objective measures, to assess the extent to which subjective measures may be biased.
. 2 (a) 1 = most negative effect, 3 = no effect, and 5 = most positive effect 
